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Prefaces  
This paper is part of the ongoing evaluation of the reform in the Norwegian employment and 
welfare administration. The paper is part of working package no 1 in this evaluation named 
Welfare model, governance system and NAV (the Norwegian acronym for the employment and welfare 
administration). The paper has been presented at the workshop The shadow line of accountability, 
performance and control across public private. Venice 17–18 April 2008. We want to thank participants 
at this workshop for comments. We also want to thank Jostein Askim and Tom Christensen at 
the University of Oslo for conduction most of the interviews we use as our empirical material. 
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Summary  
This paper addresses the big welfare administration reform in Norway. The reform is a merger of 
the employment and national insurance administrations into a new employment and welfare 
administration, combined with more formal collaboration between this new administration and 
the local government social services administration. A central component of the reform is the 
introduction of a mandatory partnership between central and local government. In this paper we 
argue that the partnership model chosen is a hybrid of hierarchy and network. A substantial 
dilemma in the partnership is how to enhance vertical accountability and control within the 
welfare state administration at the same time as sustaining the autonomy of local government in 
this policy area. The partnership model created to solve this dilemma represents a delicate and 
ambiguous balance, a balance first between accountability to the central government and the local 
council and than between sectorial and territorial specialization. The balance has yet to be tried 
out in practice.  
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet analyserer NAV-reformen med et særlig fokus på partnerskapsmodellen i reformen. 
Denne partnerskapsmodellen er et lovpålagt samarbeid mellom de statlige myndighetene 
innenfor arbeids- og velferdsetaten og de kommunale sosialtjenestene. I dette notatet 
argumenterer vi for at den valgte partnerskapsmodellen representerer en hybrid 
organisasjonsform mellom hierarki og nettverk. Et grunnleggende dilemma i partnerskapet er 
hvordan man kan oppnå vertikalt ansvar og kontroll innenfor arbeids- og velferdsetaten og 
samtidig vedlikeholde lokal autonomi på dette politikkområdet. Partnerskapsmodellen var ment å 
håndtere denne delikate balansen mellom hensynet til ministerstyreprinsippet og hensynet til det 
kommunale selvstyret, men det er mange tvetydigheter i modellen som stiller samspillet mellom 
vertikal og horisontal samordningen overfor store utfordringer. Det gjenstår å se hvordan 
partnerskapsmodellen i praksis avveier hensynet til vertikalt ansvar oppover mot sentrale 
myndigheter og hensynet til ansvar overfor kommunale folkevalgte organ og mellom sektoriell og 
territoriell spesialisering. 
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Introduction  
This paper addresses one of the largest public-sector reforms in recent Norwegian 
administrative history.1 The reform – named the NAV-reform – is a merger of the 
employment and national insurance administrations into a new employment and welfare 
administration, combined with more formal collaboration between this new 
administration and the local government social services administration. The aims of the 
NAV-reform are to increase work participation and to make the administration more 
user-friendly, more holistic and more efficient. The merger of the employment and 
insurance administrations in Norway is rather unique. Such a big merger of two large 
welfare administrations has never taken place before. The NAV-reform is further 
complicated by the fact that the social services administration – a local government 
responsibility – is also included. A central component in the reform is thus the 
introduction of a mandatory partnership between central and local government. This is 
an innovation in the Norwegian political administrative system. Never before have 
central and local government co-operated as a partnership in the form of a one-stop-
shop system (the NAV-service offices) at one geographical level. The reform can 
therefore also be seen as a «whole-of-government» or «joined-up» government initiative 
intended to increase the capacity of the political administrative system to address 
«wicked problems» cutting across existing policy areas and to improve vertical and 
horizontal coordination in the fields of policy and implementation (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007).  
Our main focus in this paper is the mandatory partnership model as a way of 
fulfilling the aims and intentions of the reform. We will particularly focus on the 
consequences of providing some of the most important services of the welfare state 
through an organizational structure which in many ways resembles a network. A central 
question will be how such a partnership challenges accountability relations in the 
political-administrative structure in Norway.  
Our empirical data are a combination of personal interviews with central political and 
administrative actors and stakeholders, public documents and studies of both the central 
reform process and of the implementation of the partnership locally.  
We will start by presenting our theoretical approach, focusing on the concepts of 
partnerships, networks and accountability. Second, we will give a brief outline of the 
Norwegian context. Third, we will present the partnership empirically by focusing on 
the following questions (Powell and Glendinning 2002): What is this partnership, and 
what is it intended for? Why has this partnership been established, and whose interests 
is it supposed to serve? Who participated in forming the partnership and who is 
involved in it? How is the partnership organized and how does it work in practice? 
                                                 
1 The NAV reform affects around 20,000 employees in the involved agencies and municipalities. The 
services included in NAV cost about 30 billion Euros annually, and have about half of the Norwegian 
population as users or clients. Around 700,000 persons of working age are either wholly or partially out 
of work at any given time. A central precondition for the reform was that no employees in any of the 
three involved administrations should lose their job because of the merger. 
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Finally, using the answers to these questions, we will discuss the implications and 
consequences of the partnership by focusing especially on accountability issues. 
Theoretical approach: Partnerships, networks and 
accountability  
Partnerships have become a popular tool in the governance of welfare. They are 
designed to enhance collaboration and cooperation across boundaries in public services 
(Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, Glendinning et al 2002). Repeated efforts to achieve 
coordination are a main argument behind using partnership models in the public sector. 
Partnership is an umbrella concept that covers many types of cooperative arrangements 
(Grimsley and Lewis 2004, Linder 2002). Analytically this makes it an elusive concept 
because it is difficult to define precisely (Powell and Glendinning 2002). A minimum 
definition of partnership is that it involves at least two organizations with some 
common interests or interdependencies. Partnership is thus a joint working arrangement 
that requires a certain level of autonomy to determine or implement a programme. The 
arrangement involves a degree of trust, equality, reciprocity and also commitment. 
Central features of partnerships are lack of hierarchy and lack of cohesiveness. A 
common assumption is also that the involved actors have clear goals regarding the aims 
of the partnership. Normally the structural arrangements around the partnership are 
rather loose, but this might vary.  
There are different kinds of partnerships. Mörth and Sahlin-Andersson (2006) 
classify partnerships along two dimensions – degree of formality and degree of 
permanence. We will add two further dimensions to these: the degree to which private 
actors are involved and the degree of voluntariness. Some partnerships can be very 
informal, time-limited, voluntary and with a strong private component. Others can be 
highly formalized, mandatory, permanent and with a weak private component. 
Partnership is closely related to networks. Networks – particularly between public 
and private actors – have recently been introduced in most western democracies as a 
way to increase the capacity of the public sector to deliver services. The use of networks 
in political-administrative structures has, however, also been highly contested both 
politically and academically. Klijn and Sklecher (2007) distinguish between four 
conjectures on democracy and networks: an incompatible, a complementary, a 
transitional and an instrumental conjecture. The first argues that representative 
democracy and networks conflict; the second that networks support democracy by 
engaging a wider network of actors in the policy process; the third argues that 
governance networks are part of a transitional process from state-centric government to 
a network form consisting of decentralized nodes of authority; while the last conjecture 
is that powerful governmental actors increase their capacity to shape and deliver public 
policy in a complex world through the instrumental use of networks (Klijn and Skecher 
2007; 598). This last conjecture challenges the `governance without government' thesis 
of Rhodes (1996) that networks are self-organizing, that the government is only one of 
many players and that there is a strong horizontal component in the networks (Bache 
2000, Davies 2002). In contrast this instrumental conjecture implies that the central 
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government is a powerful actor that creates networks and partnerships in order to 
realize its projects, and that the networks can have an agency form, created in response 
to a national mandate to be a delivery arm for a national policy initiative that requires 
inter-organizational cooperation at the local level (Skelcher et al. 2005). 
The NAV-reform is about changing the principles of specialization and the forms of 
coordination in the Norwegian welfare state (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
Different principles of specialization enhance different identities and conflict patterns in 
and between organizations and enable various networks to evolve among an 
organization's members (Fimreite et al. 2007, Fimreite and Lægreid 2008). An 
organization specialized according to geographical area will encourage policy makers to 
primarily pay attention to particular territorial concerns. Specialization according to 
purpose, on the other hand, has a tendency to weaken relations that have been 
developed territorially, for example, based on geographical units such as municipalities 
and to strengthen standardization across territorial units. Redesigning sector specialized 
organizations into geographically structured ones will thus tend to transform sector 
conflicts into territorial conflicts (Egeberg 2001, 2006).  
As a rule, modern polities are organized according to the principle of purpose, which 
makes them vertical in nature and characterized by strong sectors and weak 
coordinating mechanisms (Kettl 2003). This implies that vertical coordination within 
specific sectors may be good. The tasks of the welfare state, however, represent a 
complex and fragmented area of government, and a growing number of cases and 
problems do not fit into this traditionally sector structure. In political-administrative 
structures solving such problems is a challenge, mainly because it implies horizontal 
coordination between different sectors.  
In the NAV-reform purpose (sector) and territory as principles of specialization are 
active at the same time. Three main tasks are involved – employment, insurance and 
social services – as are three levels of government: The NAV-service offices (one-stop 
shops) are situated at the municipal level, and the NAV-agency (the merged central 
government organization) has regional branches at the county level. In addition to the 
partnership model we here also have a multi-level governance system in which tasks are 
carried out at different levels of government, implying increased interdependence of 
public agencies operating at different territorial levels, often in a complex system of 
overlapping jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe 2004, Bache and Flinders 2004). Tasks can 
rarely be treated independently of each other, the different levels have to collaborate, 
and coordination between levels is as important as coordination between sectors.  
There are (at least) two approaches to analyzing coordination in such a multi-level 
system with overlapping principles of specialization (Morris et al. 2007, Lægreid and 
Serigstad 2006). One is the classical hierarchical view that assumes that work is divided 
by sector, often used synonym with purpose or tasks (Gulick 1937). Coordination is 
achieved by the use of hierarchy, legal authority and specialization of tasks and is a 
vertical internal process with clear lines of authority. Its strengths are related to vertical 
accountability, role specifications and handling of routine tasks. But such arrangements 
are also inflexible, difficult to change and less able to handle coordination with other 
organizations outside a given sector. This is a top-down approach based on the 
hierarchical model. Such a model presumes that the organization of the welfare 
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administration must begin at the top and be directed downwards, implying strong 
political control from central government. The idea of top-down coordination is derived 
from the notion that the organizations to be coordinated have already been identified by 
headquarters coordinators, that the relationship of these organizations to each other is 
well understood, that agreement has been reached about what objectives will be 
accomplished by altering certain of these inter-organizational relationships, and that the 
authority and means to alter these relationships exist. In other words, it assumes that 
having a hierarchy will facilitate implementation. The problem in the context of welfare 
administration, however, is that several of these assumptions are only partly fulfilled, 
and the problems of coordination do not lend themselves well to hierarchical direction 
(Wise 2002:141).  
For complex, unstructured and rapidly changing problems, which, we have argued, 
are characteristic of the welfare sector, a network approach may be more suitable (Kettl 
2003; Wise 2002). This approach understands coordination as the interaction of 
interdependent actors from different traditional hierarchical structures and from outside 
such structures. They pay less heed to formal top-down authority and relies more on 
negotiations and mutual adjustments and on bringing together organizations to pool 
resources and knowledge. This network model scores high on adaptability and 
flexibility, but accountability may be reduced and ambiguous, and steering may be more 
difficult.  
A variant of this approach builds upon the idea of coordination as a contingent 
problem (Kettl 2003). What it is, how it works and how best to implement it depend on 
the nature of the issue, the nature of the organization and the nature of its employees. 
The adoption of standard, rational, hierarchical designs and practices is likely to be 
particularly unsuitable for organizations expected to operate in complex, unstable and 
unpredictable environments. Unstable environments require flexibility, rapid decisions 
and changes and thus create a need for greater decentralization of authority and less 
emphasis on formal structure, since it takes too long for information to travel up and 
down a rigid hierarchy. The key is to create systems that are versatile and flexible and are 
able to adapt to local situations. In this approach the focus is not on strong central 
control but on better ways of collecting and processing information – from the bottom 
up and from the outside in (Kettl 2003). Contingent coordination implies that separate 
and distinct actors at different levels of government, each with its own formal 
hierarchical structure, work collaboratively when the situation demands collaboration 
(Morris et al. 2007).  
A third model, which can be labelled the hybrid model, combines the hierarchical and 
the network models. In this model there is a stronger supervisory and regulatory role for 
semi-independent central agencies, which is supplemented by a partnership model in 
each local employment and welfare office. Along the vertical dimension the central 
agency has a semi-autonomous status which represents more than `delegated hierarchy' 
from the parent ministry. The agency operates on the principle of professional 
knowledge and should be free from instruction by the cabinet or individual ministers 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006). It carries out regulation using its own delegated 
regulatory power, resources and responsibilities. On the horizontal dimension this 
model tries to enhance overall responsibility for welfare state policy through local 
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partnerships with municipalities and also central framework agreements with the 
municipalities' interest organization. Thus this hybrid model gives statutory power to the 
central agency and some coordinating responsibility to a superior ministry and shares 
responsibility for welfare state tasks with the local authorities through a partnership 
model.  
A main concern that arises when partnership is used within the public sector is the 
problem of accountability. Accountability is a multidimensional concept. The 
hierarchical model can be connected to a sovereign state model (Olsen 1988). The 
concept of accountability is here primarily related to hierarchical responsibility, 
underlining upward accountability to political sovereigns (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). The network or partnership models will make a model of strictly hierarchical 
responsibility from the top less applicable. A partnership model is more linked to what 
Olsen (1988) calls a bargaining state model. In this latter model there is outward 
accountability towards interest organizations and other stakeholders that participate in 
the partnership in an integrated manner. The capacity of a partnership to act is obtained 
at the cost of a loss of accountability of all the participants in the policy process. 
Partnerships need some level of independence but at the same time they shall be 
accountable upwards to politicians, horizontally to other agencies and local government 
and downwards to citizens (whether these are voters, clients or users). They thus have 
to face the challenges of political as well as administrative and bureaucratic, legal and 
professional accountability (Pollitt 2003). The bargaining state implies a process of 
negotiations within the partnerships which is difficult to penetrate and in which 
responsibility for the final outcome is often unclear.  
In the complicated organizational structure chosen in the NAV-reform, mandatory 
partnership between central and local government is an important measure for 
coordinating processes as well as results between the involved agencies and actors. A 
central accountability issue is thus how the relationship between government and 
networks impinges on ministerial responsibility. It is generally accepted that ministries 
should be allowed to give some interpretative guidance to partnerships in how to carry 
out their tasks. This is expected to be general guidance and not directed at specific cases 
but in practice they allow rather strong governmental control. Partnerships might also 
weaken accountability to political bodies at the local level. A joint front-line unit is 
supposed to balance local accountability to the municipal council with vertical 
ministerial accountability. Weaker upwards accountability to the parliament and 
accountability to the local council may, however, be supplemented by stronger 
downwards accountability to users, clients and citizens. Partnerships scoring high on 
formality and permanence are constrained by procedural and substantive rules that 
define their discretion. Autonomy from direct political control does not automatically 
mean immunity from public accountability. Thus, responsiveness towards users and 
clients might become a substitute for accountability in the control of autonomous 
central agencies.  
We will claim that networks as a coordinating mechanism in the chosen partnership 
model supplement rather than substituting for the traditional welfare state hierarchy 
(Verhoest, Bouckart and Peters 2007). One consequence of this is that accountability 
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relations are challenged. In this paper we will scrutinize this argument further, but first 
we will give a brief outline of the Norwegian context.  
The Norwegian context  
Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multi-party state with a small population spread 
over a rather large geographical area. Since the early 1970s, it has been ruled by minority 
governments, but this changed in 2005 when a centre-left majority coalition came to 
power. There is a strong democratic tradition in Norway, and collectivist and egalitarian 
values are important. Consensus-orientation is crucial, the level of internal conflicts is 
low, and corporatist arrangements are well developed. Per capita income is relatively 
high and there is an abundance of natural resources. The level of labour market 
participation in Norway is high, also among women and elderly people. The 
unemployment rate is one of the lowest in Europe – 1.8 percent in February 2008. 
Norway has a significant tradition of local self-government. Local authorities with their 
own elected democratic institutions have wide competencies. There are a total of 431 
municipalities in Norway with an average population of around 10,000 inhabitants. The 
Norwegian welfare state is one of the most comprehensive and universal in the world, 
with a large public sector. In the Norwegian model welfare politics are mostly decided at 
the central level, but they are adapted to local needs and circumstances and 
implemented by local government. Local government is responsible for social welfare, 
elementary schools, care of the elderly and primary health care and thus constitutes a 
major part of the public sector both in terms of the number of employees and in terms 
of financial resources. National insurance and labour market administration have, 
however, been the responsibility of central government. The relationship between 
central and local government is a mixture of political decentralization, based on the 
principle of local autonomy, and administrative decentralization, based on the principle 
of delegated authority. Generally specialization by sector is very strong in the 
Norwegian central government administration. The sector ministries have a strong 
position based on the principle of ministerial responsibility. The same sectors have also 
dominated the political and administrative structures at local government level.  
Political control over the civil service has been general and passive, allowing the 
executive considerable leeway. This seems to reflect high levels of mutual trust and 
shared attitudes and norms among political and administrative leaders, within the public 
sector in general and in the relationship between the central and local authorities 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2005; Fimreite et al. 2004). The level of trust in public 
institutions in Norway is generally higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999).  
In Norway administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected co-
operation across sectors. Major reform measures, such as performance management, 
performance auditing, monitoring and control, have first and foremost been directed at 
the vertical, sector-based dimension of public administration (Christensen and Lægreid 
2001). Other reform measures, such as structural devolution through the formation of 
state-owned companies and semi-autonomous regulatory agencies, have, however, 
increased fragmentation and challenged vertical coordination. As a result of these 
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movements, horizontal coordination between sectors has become more difficult at the 
central level. One consequence is that it is difficult to establish cross-ministerial 
cooperation in policy areas (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008).  
By contrast, reform tendencies at the local level in Norway are more or less the 
opposite. In local government sectors have formally been merged and specialization 
principles other than sectoral have become more important. Local horizontal 
coordination has become easier, but at the same time the sector-based relationship 
between the central and local levels, so important in the Norwegian welfare state, has 
suffered (Tranvik and Fimreite 2006).  
In the Norwegian welfare state, sectors divided by tasks or purposes have 
traditionally been an important mechanism for coordination between different levels 
both locally and centrally. However, when sector ceased to be the main principle of 
specialization at the lowest level, coordination between levels became a challenge. It is 
this challenge that the NAV-reform is intended to meet by formally integrating services 
that are both central government responsibilities (the employment and insurance 
administrations) and the responsibility of local government (social services 
administration). The multi-level aspect is further emphasized by the fact that different 
government levels have to coordinate tasks at the same territorial level and under the 
same leadership in the «one-stop-shop» arrangements in municipalities. This front-line 
service is supposed to be run as a central-local partnership regulated by local 
agreements. The partnership itself is, however, mandatory as it is based in law to which 
both central and local government are subject. Central government does not assume 
local government responsibilities or vice versa. The reform is therefore also an 
important component of multi-level governance (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 
2007). We will now describe the NAV partnership model in more detail.  
The partnership model in NAV  
Wha t  i s  t h e  pa r t ne r sh i p  and  why  was  i t  
e s t ab l i s hed?   
In 2001 the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) requested that the government (a 
Centre-Right minority coalition government) should consider a merger of the three 
main welfare administrations – the insurance administration, the employment 
administration and the local social services administration. The government's proposal, 
which was based on the work of an inter-ministerial working group headed by an 
externally recruited researcher, was that the welfare administrations should continue to 
be divided into three parts (insurance, employment and social services), but a one-stop 
shop at the local level should be created encompassing the latter two services 
(St.meld.no 14 (2002–2003)). The Storting rejected this proposal, and the government 
set up an expert commission to elucidate anew the organization of the welfare state 
administration. The commission worked on four different models for a merged 
administration. Their final proposal (NOU 2004: 13) was however very similar to the 
one that had already been rejected. It stated that there should be one administration for 
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income and employment, one for pensions and social rights, and one for social services, 
and that the latter should remain a local government responsibility. The government 
was, however, reluctant to present the Storting with a proposal that was more or less the 
same as the previous one.  
When the expert report was delivered, a new ministry had been established owing to 
inter-cabinet rotations. For the first time responsibility for both the insurance 
administration and for the employment administration was integrated into one ministry, 
and the laws regulating local governments' social services administration were also part 
of this new super-ministry's portfolio. Merging political responsibility paved the way for 
a coordinated effort to implement the reform. The minister in the new Ministry for 
Labor and Social Affairs was a former director of the National Insurance 
Administration, but he had also had experience as an executive administrative manager 
at local government level and been a director of the Norwegian Association of Local 
and Regional Authorities (KS).2 He signalled early on that he would not follow up the 
proposal from the expert commission. His priority was to build a user-friendly 
organization and to create a welfare administration in Norway that was oriented towards 
user-participation. To do this he advocated merging the administrations of insurance 
and employment at all levels, leaving intact the autonomy and tasks of local government, 
which implied that the social services administration was to remain a local government 
responsibility, and creating a joint front-line service in each municipality bringing 
together the merged employment and insurance administrations and the social services 
administration. The partnership model was introduced as a way of fulfilling these three 
goals. 
The partnership model was an organizational innovation in the Norwegian political-
administrative system that aimed to combine the principle of ministerial responsibility 
and a strong sector specialization on the one hand and the principle of local self-
government and territorial specialization on the other hand. It was promoted as the 
missing link between local self-government and ministerial responsibility. There had 
been some minor experiments with partnership models between local and central 
government – for instance, in the area of public health – and also with local one-stop 
shops in the welfare administration on a voluntary basis, but without any great success. 
The government also looked to other countries, such as Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, for inspiration, where one-stop-shops operate the local employment 
administration and social services on the basis of partnerships. 
The partnership model was intended to create joint operative solutions with two 
owners, the municipalities and the government agency. The solutions imply dual 
accountability relationships – upwards within the sector to central government and 
horizontally to the local government authorities. The model was based on the following 
principles:  
                                                 
2 KS is the organization representing the interests of employers and municipalities. Nearly all 
municipalities are members. It is an advisory and consultative body that acts as a spokesman and 
represents the interests of its members vis-à-vis central government and the Parliament. It also advises 
and informs the municipalities about matters of importance to local government, facilitates exchange of 
experiences between municipalities and conducts collective wage bargaining on behalf of local 
government. But it has no formal instruction power against the municipalities. 
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• The partnership is compulsory by law and mandatory for all 
municipalities. 
• There should be one welfare office in every municipality (there was also 
an opening for solution where two or more municipalities shared an 
office). 
• The welfare office should be a joint front-line service implying co-location 
of the social services administration and the new employment and welfare 
administration (the amalgamated employment administration and 
insurance service administration).  
• The welfare office could either have a joint management or a dual 
management arrangement – with one manager from the municipality and 
one from the employment and welfare administration (government).  
• From the municipal side the welfare office should as a minimum include 
financial social assistance, financial advices, housing of homeless people 
and the right for each individual to have a plan worked out connected to 
social and welfare services.  
This implies that the joint front-line office represents cooperation between the central 
and local authorities. It is a collaboration model. The one-stop-shops are based on fixed, 
regulated and binding cooperation between the central and the local authorities. The 
partnership will be laid down in local cooperation agreements, negotiated between the 
regional NAV-office and the individual municipality. The fact that these partnerships 
are not voluntary is an important component of the reform.  
There is a trade-off in the partnership arrangements between central government's 
need for standardization and local government's need for local adaptation and flexibility. 
The central agency worked hard for a mandatory arrangement, for the principle of a 
unitary management model and for a standardized task portfolio for the local front-line 
office. This was not acceptable to the actors defending local self government, such as 
the KS – which negotiated at the central level on behalf of the 431 municipalities and 
the Ministry of Local and Regional Government. In line with the Norwegian consensus-
oriented policy-making style the result was a compromise: it was agreed that the 
arrangement should be mandatory, that the unitary management model should be 
recommended but a dual management model should also be accepted, that financial 
social assistance should be the minimum municipal task in the front-line unit, but that 
other municipal tasks could also be included in a specific local partnership. Thus the 
partnership arrangements avoided too much detailed top-down steering and allowed for 
local flexibility. The flexibility regarding which municipal tasks could be included and 
the flexible management model were both concessions to local self-government and 
corresponded with the existing Local Government Act, which grants local authorities a 
high level of discretion when it comes to organizational matters. The model was 
characterized by central top civil servants as a ‘sunshine’ or ‘fair weather’ model that 
would work well as long as there was consensus about means and ends between the 
municipal side and the governmental side in the NAV-office, but would run into a lot of 
trouble if there were conflicts between the local authorities and government bodies.  
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The basis for the local partnership agreements was a framework agreement at the 
central level between the government and the KS. This was the first time such a central 
partnership agreement had been settled between the government and the KS and was 
supposed to send an important political signal to the government agency and to the 
individual municipalities on the establishment of a local partnership agreement for the 
front-line service. Local manager-training and joint competence-enhancement programs 
were included in this central agreement. The central partnership differs from the local 
because it is not mandatory and because the KS cannot take decisions that commit the 
municipalities. The central partnership constitutes a consulting arrangement between the 
government and the KS, but nevertheless plays an important symbolic role. The 
presence of the central partnership is more important than the actual substance of it. 3 
Who  we r e  t he  « f ound i ng  f a t h e r s»  o f  t h e  
pa r t n e r sh i p  mode l ?   
The minister of the newly merged ministry for Labor and Social Affairs proved to be a 
clever political entrepreneur, who succeeded in getting active support from central civil 
servants in constructing the partnership model, in changing the government position 
through negotiations within the cabinet and co-opting the KS. The minister made great 
efforts to engage in a dialogue with the Storting. By garnering support from the Labor 
Party, which was the main opposition party, he managed to make the Storting more 
receptive to a solution that was not its first priority. He made a great effort to integrate 
the central stakeholders in the decision-making process and to involve the political 
parties at the Storting in informal consultations.  
The partnership idea came up in a creative cooperation process between this minister 
and a few central top civil servants in his own ministry. A main strategy was to achieve 
joint understanding and agreement with the KS and also with the opposition in the 
Storting. The KS was involved in creating reference groups to counterbalance the 
dominance of central agencies favoring a standardized model that would limit the 
autonomy of the local authorities. The KS also played an important role in legitimizing 
the process in the municipalities.  
The government proposal received the support of the Storting, even though it did 
not include a full merger. The standing committee for social affairs emphasized the 
challenges of merging two services with different cultures, goals and steering measures 
and pointed out the need for careful planning and implementation. Several of the 
political parties said it was imperative that the new model at the local level should 
produce better co-operation among the services, and they also stressed the user-
friendliness and cost-efficiency aspects of the proposal. The Progressive Party, the right-
wing populist party, proposed central government control of the merged services, 
including social services, but this proposal was not supported by any of the other 
parties.  
                                                 
3 This was also when the agreement between the KS and the Ministry was entered into the only practical way to do it. 
The employment and welfare administration was not yet established and the Ministry could not enter into 
agreements with all 431 municipalities. 
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Summing up, there was a strong political wish in Norway to establish a front-line 
service with an employment and welfare office in every municipality. A partnership 
between central and local government was designed to provide coordinated services 
better adapted to users' needs and to replace the present system of three different 
offices in each municipality. That is why this partnership was established. A network of 
local offices would constitute a coordinated front-line service with responsibility for 
employment, sick leave, medical and occupational rehabilitation, disability pensions, 
financial social assistance, pensions and family benefits. Central government 
responsibility would be concentrated in one agency: The employment and welfare 
agency (NAV) which was to cooperate closely with the individual local authorities. That 
is what constitutes the partnership. The partnership was invented by a new minister in a 
new “super» ministry and his civil servants who were searching for a “Columbian egg 
solution» that would simultaneously establish a one-stop-shop in every municipality in 
which all three services were included and accept the present division of tasks and 
responsibilities between central and local government. That is who established the 
partnership.  
NAV is a radical departure from the traditional employment and welfare 
administration, but it also represents a complicated arrangement of central–local 
government cooperation and division of responsibility. The formal division of 
responsibility between the central and local authorities has not changed in a 
fundamental way. The hierarchy is still there: Political responsibility for the national 
insurance service as well as for labor-market policy remains with central government, 
while financial social assistance remains a discretion-based, means-tested benefit under 
local politicians' control. Both coordination between the three administrations at local 
level and the one-stop-shop idea, which is akin to a network, represent challenges for 
administrations/services and government levels accustomed to territorial as well as 
cultural distance. We now turn to focus on how this new system has been implemented 
and with what possible consequences.  
How  t h e  pa r t n e r sh i p  mode l  ha s  been  imp l emen ted  
–  expe r i en ce s  and  po t en t i a l  e f f e c t s   
As a consequence of the Storting's approval of the government proposal an interim 
organization for the new employment and welfare organization (NAV) was set up in 
2005 and the new central agency was formally established on 1 July 2006. Legislative 
amendments providing for a new employment and welfare administration were 
approved by the Storting in 2006 (St.prp. no 46 (2004–2005)).  
In October 2005 a Central-Left majority coalition government came to power and 
became responsible for implementing the reform. The plan is that the front-line service 
units (the one-stop-shops) based on local partnerships will be implemented in all 
municipalities by 2010. It is therefore too early to measure most effects of the reform 
directly. Nevertheless, we argue that it is of value to discuss the implementation of the 
reform and some preliminary effects, as well as potential effects and implications, both 
from a scholarly point of view, involving the more broad questions of principle, like 
balancing political control and institutional autonomy, and in more practical terms. It is 
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important to discuss the intended and expected effects on the main goals as well as 
possible unexpected side effects. The basis for discussing potential effects of the new 
structure includes findings from earlier studies of comparable reorganizations, the 
reform process itself and the organizational thinking behind it, the formal structural 
changes actually made, the challenges identified, and some early actual effects.  
There seems to be a tendency in the reform literature to infer too easily from 
processes to effects (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 
Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). The assumption that the actual effects will 
correspond with the stated goals of political and administrative executives must, 
therefore, be challenged. As we have documented, the goals of the reform and the 
means-ends knowledge underlying it are ambiguous; in addition the reform may be 
modified and changed during the implementation process. Added to this is the 
attribution problem of isolating the effects of the reform from other economic and 
societal factors. All this makes the effect issue difficult to handle (Christensen et al. 
2007). We will try to tackle this problem by combining a theoretical approach with 
insights into the process of reform and knowledge of the effects of other similar 
reforms.  
So far about 130 local partnerships have been established based on local agreements. 
Most of these offices have unitary management, but there are also some with dual 
management models. Most of the managers come from the former employment 
administration or from the insurance service, but there are also some managers who are 
local government employees. There are substantial variations in what tasks the 
municipalities include in the partnership. Many municipalities have added tasks such as 
alcohol and drug prevention, housing, immigration, debt advice, psychiatric health care 
and child welfare. Some partnerships have also evolved their own specific aims for the 
local one-stop-shops in the agreements while others have not. It is obligatory for 
services included in the partnership to be co-located. Some one-stop-shops are also co-
located with other local government services, but most of them are not. 
Experience so far has shown that it is difficult to establish holistic, integrated and 
seamless services based on partnership at the local level because the traditional steering 
links to the central government and to the municipalities are still strong (Haugli Nyhus 
and Thorsen 2007). The hierarchy is still very much present. A study of the first 25 pilot 
offices indicates that the municipalities are rather satisfied with the NAV-reform so far, 
and the employees in the one-stop-shops are generally positive about the reform (Alm 
Andreassen et al. 2007). There has been no significant change in customer satisfaction. 
The study reveals, however, that the partnership model is challenging as well. Fifty 
percent of the political and administrative executives in the pilot municipalities are so far 
satisfied with the partnership, but only one third of the employees at the local offices 
characterize collaboration at the local level as satisfying. Achieving a delicate balance 
between top-down steering, demands, negotiations, dialogue and mutual cooperation 
both with the municipalities and with the external bodies is tricky. Another big challenge 
is the issue of competence, since respect for the municipalities and their competence has 
been rather weak. Cooperation seems also to work best in small units and in units with a 
unified management. One concern that is especially strong in the KS is that the local 
partnerships in practice will not be between equal partners and that the representatives 
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from the former employment and insurance administrations will act as “big brother». 
One reason for this concern is that a local partnership is concluded between the regional 
NAV-office based at the county level and each individual municipality. But since there 
are at least 25 municipalities in each county this implies that the regional NAV-manager 
and his/her staff will soon become far more experienced than the municipality 
regarding the form and content of the partnership. Another reason for the concern is 
that tasks which are regulated as individual rights are about to be moved out of the 
competency of the one-stop shops and assigned to specialized government offices at the 
regional level. To avoid an erosion of the local offices the government has, however, 
decided that each one-stop shop should have a minimum staff of three positions.  
The first results from the evaluation also reveal that among central civil servants 
there is a strong wish for more standardization in relations with local offices. Many of 
them report that the partnership model is an obstacle to efficient implementation of the 
NAV-reform. There is a tension between the need for local cooperation based on 
reciprocity and equal partners and top-down steering. To handle this tension a 
partnership forum has been established at the local level where the municipality is 
represented by the administrative executive manager (in some cases the mayor) and 
where the central government side is represented by the county NAV-manager. The 
partnership forum is intended to handle governmental steering initiatives and resolve 
conflicts between actors. 
One question to be raised is whether this new administrative apparatus is likely to 
increase political control over the administrations and services involved or whether it 
will instead increase institutional and professional autonomy. The preconditions for 
more political control are certainly there. First, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Inclusion4 has overall responsibility for two of the services involved, which means that 
co-ordination is easier than if the services had been divided among several ministries. 
Second, the two merged administrations are centrally based, while the social services are 
locally based, which would potentially give the central apparatus the upper hand, 
particularly if the NAV agency is closely controlled by the ministry. Third, the services 
being merged will have different structures, professions and cultures to cope with, 
something that does not point in the direction of increased institutional and professional 
autonomy. Added to this the government and municipal employees have different 
working conditions, wage agreements and personnel management systems, which has 
produced conflicts and tensions. However, if the process of creating a homogeneous 
structural and cultural service is successful, this picture may change. 
The partnership model means that the central and local levels of government now 
operate at the same geographical level integrated within the same office. For multi-level 
governance in Norway this is a totally new experience. This new arrangement will 
probably solve some coordination problems such as between employment and 
insurance services, but it is also expected to create others such as between the local and 
central authorities. An independent local political level, with its own political bodies, 
now manages one third of the office, while the other two-thirds are managed by 
                                                 
4 The Ministry changed its name after the centre-left coalition came into power in 2005 and it also expanded its 
portfolio to include immigration. 
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delegated central government power. One important stipulation of the reform is that 
whatever model or solution is eventually chosen for the organization of the one-stop-
shop locally, it must be situated in one locality and as a main rule managed by one chief 
executive. This is new in Norwegian administration, and an important question is if and 
how it will affect the autonomy of local self government.  
Another main aspect of the reform as a post-NPM reorganization is the effects of 
some of the main coordinative efforts made. The organizational thinking behind the 
reform is rather ambiguous, based on loose assumptions about the connection between 
the merger and relocation and the effects on services and users. One major question is 
whether the reorganization is overly geared to coping with multi-service users. While 
these users are indeed likely to be better off with a coordinated structure, the outcome 
of the merger for the remaining 85% who normally use only one of the original services 
may actually be negative. For these users the merger may create more complexity and 
confusion and hence a potentially poorer service. Thus, the new administration is likely 
to have a highly differentiated internal structure or it may even engage in new 
reorganizations to spin off some units that do not naturally belong together. One can of 
course hope for “smart practice» and seamless internal collaboration, but there is 
obviously a concern that operations may not run as smoothly as that (Christensen, 
Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
One indication that the reform has been too encompassing is that the ministry and 
agency have decided to move a lot of people from the local NAV office working with 
pensions and other legally-regulated services to large regional units, suggesting that 
some tasks at the local level do not naturally belong together and that they do not need 
to be situated at the local level. This decision may make the local NAV-offices weaker 
because they will lose people and competence, but it may also make them stronger 
because the remaining tasks are easier to integrate and are subject to more local 
discretion. 
There are also some question-marks concerning the one-stop shops and 
collaboration between the two merged administrations and the social services locally. 
Will the new collaboration be based on a common understanding about how to realize 
the main goals of the reforms, or will there be structural and cultural problems? One 
particular tension in the new structure that is not easy to resolve is that the newly 
merged employment and welfare administration is likely to attend primarily to national 
goals and standardization issues, while the social services are naturally closer to the 
culture and concerns of the local administrative apparatus, which will result in some 
divergence. Whether bringing the administrations together physically in local one-stop 
shops will have any effect on this is more of an open question.  
Summing up, the partnership model in the NAV-reform is a public-public 
partnership. The model is mainly based on partnerships at the local level, but joined-up 
government at the central level is addressed to some extent by involving the 
municipalities' interest organization (KS) in formulating a general framework through a 
central partnership agreement. The NAV-partnership is mandatory, permanent, 
formalized through contracts and agreements, and includes mainly public partners at the 
central and local levels.  
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The NAV partnership model therefore differs from a «classic» public–private 
partnership (PPP) in two essential ways: private actors play a minor role in the 
partnership, and it is mandatory. It is also based on rather strict formal arrangements. 
The similarities between the NAV-partnership and a PPP are that it is a close 
collaborational and contractual venture with some durability and it has been concluded 
between organizations that rely upon agreement between the partners in return for 
some positive outcomes for each participant and that provide citizens with public goods 
and services (Mörth 2007, Carroll and Steane 2000). Other overlapping features between 
the NAV-partnership and PPPs are that they are about power-sharing, and there is a 
common understanding that the partnership involves equal partners. We will claim that 
these features make the NAV-partnership a partnership although a special type of 
partnership.  
Discussion  
The NAV-reform process seems to have some special features that distinguish it 
from other large reform processes in Norway. One is that in a minority government 
situation the Storting has tried repeatedly to instruct the cabinet and ministry to pursue 
the idea of fully merging the three services. This is politically understandable, but 
unusual, since it is the prerogative of any government to organize its own apparatus. 
What is more, in trying to resist a full merger the political executive has engaged in a 
kind of symbolic tug-of-war with the Storting, and eventually succeeded. In other words 
the reform has brought a lot of ambiguity into the relationship between the legislature 
and the political executive. This has made the organizational thinking behind the reform 
unusually varied, tension-ridden and ambiguous (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 
2007).  
Although the experts stressed that a merger was not a good solution, the political 
executive decided to propose one anyway, without having many good arguments for 
doing so. Normally reforms like this are based on the competence of experts, but on 
this occasion the political leadership had to propose something that the Storting could 
accept, even if it meant a complex and uncertain solution, and therefore did not listen to 
the experts. So the experts' opinions were confronted by political logic. The result was a 
situation where the experts, the political executive and the Storting all insisted that their 
structural solution would further the main goals of the reforms, bringing further 
ambiguity into the process. 
As a consequence of the Norwegian consensus-oriented style of decision-making 
there is a strong wish to come up with compromises that everyone can accept. This is 
done by building ambiguity into the chosen solutions that provides flexibility and room 
for different interpretations of the new models. In this case the solution represented 
something new, which has the potential to change the Norwegian `living' constitution. 
In Norway the principle of local government autonomy is strong and hard to challenge. 
Therefore the partnership model between local and central government as an 
intermediate organizational form combining the principle of local self-government and 
the principle of ministerial responsibility was quite an innovation. What made it possible 
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was the ambiguity of the new principle; how it will be specified and practiced is, 
however, an empirical question. The partnership is thus the product of a strong belief in 
the present political-administrative structure in Norway combined with a simultaneously 
felt need to modernize this structure.  
In a political-administrative structure based on a representative democracy clear 
accountability to the political executives is a central concern. An important question 
therefore is whether the NAV-reform will lead to more unambiguous and transparent 
accountability or whether it will instead produce an “accountability deficit» (Baldwin et 
al. 1998, Christensen and Lægreid 2006). In a representative democracy elected elites are 
answerable to the public. The desire to get re-elected acts as a disciplining force on 
elected representatives. Publicity and transparency are thus important for accountability, 
because the electorate needs information in the re-election process (Aars and Fimreite 
2005:244). Partnerships and networks operate according to different standards. They are 
often self-elected, their decision-making is normally not as public as decision-making in 
representative political institutions, and they are not as formally organized as those (Aars 
and Fimreite 2005:244). To claim accountability in network structures is more 
challenging than in politically formalized institutions. These arguments apply not just to 
decision-making but also to service-delivery in a political-administrative structure. In the 
democratic power-chain the implementers and service-deliverers principally derive their 
mandate directly from the elected politicians and are therefore accountable to them. 
This accountability is, however, more administrative and audit-oriented than the 
accountability of politicians to the electorate, which also implies an aspect of moral 
responsibility (Christensen and Lægreid 2002).  
For the NAV-partnership the question of administrative accountability is obviously 
relevant. At the same time the partnership model tends not to clarify lines of 
accountability. A key question in the partnership model is how one can have joint 
action, common standards and shared systems on the one hand, and vertical 
accountability for individual agency performance on the other. The challenge is to 
balance better accountability to central government, accountability to local council, and 
responsiveness downwards (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). Going back to Olsen's 
bargaining state model it implies a process of negotiation between different political and 
administrative executives and members of governing coalitions which is difficult to 
penetrate and in which accountability for the final outcome is often unclear. There is an 
inbuilt inconsistency in the NAV-reform. It claims to empower users and clients, free 
managers, enhance administrative accountability and strengthen political control both 
from central and local political bodies. But in reality it is difficult to achieve these things 
simultaneously. 
The NAV-reform is in many ways built on post-NPM views of coordination and 
collaboration. Vertical coordination, meaning how the central government should 
secure control over the new services and standardize them, is important and can be 
based on a) political control, indicating a traditional, centralized structure, b) production, 
suggesting more devolution-oriented solutions and c) rights, for example making greater 
use of independent appeal bodies. When it comes to vertical accountability the 
relationship between the ministry and the central NAV-agency is of great importance. 
The organizational solution apparently envisaged here is a more traditional ministry-
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agency relationship, where there is a balance between control and autonomy. Added to 
this is the internal vertical coordination inside the NAV-agency and the inter-
governmental coordination between the central agency and the regional and local parts 
of the apparatus.  
Horizontal coordination on different levels also has an impact on administrative 
accountability. The horizontal intra-ministerial coordination between the employment 
and insurance administrations and other areas in the ministry is no exception to this; 
neither is the inter-ministerial coordination between the employment and welfare 
administrations on the one hand and other related policy areas such as education and 
health on the other. Added to this there are also concerns about vertical coordination 
involving the mechanisms the ministry has to influence social services locally in the 
tension between sector-based and territorial specialization. The advantage here is that all 
the relevant areas now come under the ministry, potentially furthering coordination. The 
disadvantage is that the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion is huge, and the political 
leadership may have capacity problems. Whether the different levels of the NAV-agency 
will manage to coordinate employment and insurance services as planned is also an 
important question, as is local coordination with the social services inside the one-stop 
shops. At the very local level coordination with locally elected political and 
administrative executives is also a challenge (Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007).  
Given that these decentralized nodes are responsible for the most important services 
in the welfare state, it is important for accountability that the partnerships are publicly 
visible. The NAV-partnerships have so far been rather transparent. The actors are 
known, decision-making is public and there are also procedures for appeal. In addition 
the attention of the media, researchers and also organized users is focused on the 
partnerships and their ability to deliver. To accept such public scrutiny is part of being 
accountable in a transparent democratic society, and it is important that politicians are 
involved in the partnership (Aars and Fimreite 2005:245). Mayors take part in the NAV-
partnership locally, and at the central level the minister is also directly involved. 
Decentralized nodes as networks may be held accountable through the internalization of 
values and norms (March and Olsen 1995:154, Sørensen 2002). To create democratic 
attitudes in the partnerships is of great significance if they are to operate with the kind 
of publicity and transparency needed to enhance democratic accountability. To create 
such attitudes is mainly the task of the political authorities – at both the local and central 
levels (Aars and Fimreite 2005:245–6). The partnership is, however, a rather hybrid 
model given the structural constraints that constitute it and it is too early to know the 
balance between different accountability relations play out in practice.    
If we relate the NAV-partnership to Klijn and Sklecher's (2007) four conjectures on 
democracy and networks it is obvious that they bear most resemblance to what the 
authors call the instrumental conjecture. The central government has been a powerful 
actor in creating the partnership in order to realize its own project. The partnership has 
an agency form created in response to a national mandate to be a delivery arm for a 
national policy initiative that requires inter-organizational cooperation at the local level 
(Skelcher et al 2005). Powerful governmental actors increase their capacity to shape and 
deliver public policy in a complex world through the instrumental use of partnerships. It 
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might also be understood as a step in a transitional process from state-centric 
government to a network form consisting of decentralized nodes of authority. 
Summing up, the organization of the welfare administration constitutes a double 
balancing act because it requires coordination between the responsible ministry and the 
central agency and its subordinate bodies on the one hand and between the government 
administration and the municipalities on the other hand. The partnership model is a 
hybrid of hierarchy and networks. A substantial dilemma is how to enhance vertical 
accountability and control within the welfare state administration at the same time as 
sustaining the autonomy of local government in this policy area. To solve this dilemma 
the partnership model was introduced, but it represents a delicate and ambiguous 
balance between accountability to the central government and to the local council and 
between specialization by sector and territory that has yet to be tried out in practice.  
Conclusion  
A public-public partnership has been established as part of the NAV-reform. The main 
intention of this move is to make it possible to operate a coordinated welfare 
administration through a one-stop shop at local level and at the same time preserve the 
present division of tasks and authority between central and local government. As an 
organizational phenomenon such a partnership is ambiguous and not well understood, 
and how well it works in practice is an open question (Pollitt 2003). This kind of 
collaboration requires a high level of trust and healthy and active relationships between 
the involved partners to foster improved outcome (May and Winter 2007). There is no 
evidence to conclude that the partnership model represents a more advanced form of 
democracy than traditional representative democracy. One reason for this is that 
accountability relations are more ambiguous in partnership/network structures than in 
structures based on representative political institutions. There are less clear lines of 
accountability for decision-making and service-delivery in partnership – and hence also 
in the new Norwegian welfare administration.  
The idea of a partnership that can cross territorial and sector based silos in the 
welfare state system appears very attractive. Yet in the NAV-model the legal 
responsibilities and local government responsibilities of a traditional vertical 
organization are combined with an ambiguous partnership model with competing lines 
of authorities. The managers in the partnerships are supposed to be multiply 
accountable to their superiors in the regional and central NAV agency, to the local 
council and political and administrative executives in the municipality as well as to users 
and clients. Different actors are responsible for different aspects of joint activity and the 
managers have several lines of accountability – towards the central government political 
executives but also political accountability to the local government political executives. 
Added to this they have legal, professional and bureaucratic accountability (Pollitt 2003).  
Another problem is linking the sectoral objectives issued from the top down with the 
local formulated targets in the municipalities. Unless cross-cutting local targets are given 
equal status in the partnership with top-down organization-specific targets, the 
partnership will have difficulty becoming a major tool (Pollitt 2003). Partnership models 
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have a strong positive flavour and are generally seen as a good thing. When partnership 
is on the agenda, it is, however, also important to pay attention to the fact that the “silo 
mentalities» these structures and reform initiatives are supposed to attack often exist for 
very good reasons (Page 2005). Well-defined vertical and horizontal organizational 
boundaries are not only a symptom of obsolescent thinking (Pollitt 2003). Very often 
they are justified by principles underlying our political structure, such as division of 
power, predictability, impartiality, rule-of-law, professional confidentiality and 
protection of privacy. Breaking these boundaries may pose new challenges to the 
political administrative system, but a more serious issue is perhaps that it may also 
change the way our democracy operates.  
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25‐2003  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard: «Downstream merger with upstream market 
power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and Political 
Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the Italian Case». 
December 2003. 
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1‐2002  Håkon Høst: «Lærlingeordning eller skolebasert utdanning i pleie‐ og omsorgsfagene?». April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand and Per Solvang: «Rome – a Temporary Deaf City! Deaflympics 2001». 
June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 2001». June 
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5‐2002  Elin  Aasmundrud Mathiesen:  «Fritt  sykehusvalg.  En  teoretisk  analyse  av  konkurranse  i  det  norske 
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6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud: «Mål‐ og resultatstyring gjennom statlige budsjettreformer». July 2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». July 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske  argument  og 
empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik: «Mangfold eller konformitet? Likheter og forskjeller innenfor og mellom fem 
statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global  Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy  in Norway and  the 
United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September  2002. 
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14‐2002  Atle Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap. Verdsflukt  og  verdsherredømme». 
September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Complex Patterns of Interaction and Influence Among Political and 
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16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education Systems». 
Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per  Lægreid,  Runolfur  Smari  Steinthorsson  and  Baldur  Thorhallsson:  «Europeanization  of  Public 
Administration: Effects of the EU on the Central Administration in the Nordic States». November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  —  the  Relative  Importance  of  Service 
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21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital Investment».December 
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22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary 
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23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. Tre 
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24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i Bergen og 
Oslo 1850–1935». December 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering av 
økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». December 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk styring?». 
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31-2002 Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». December 2002. 
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